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Abstract. The economy-wide implications of sea level rise in 2050 are estimated using a static
computable general equilibrium model. This allows for a better estimate of the welfare eﬀects
of sea level rise than the common direct cost estimates; and for an estimate of the impact of sea
level rise on greenhouse gas emissions. Overall, general equilibrium eﬀects increase the welfare
costs of sea level rise, but not necessarily in every sector or region. In the absence of coastal
protection, economies that rely most on agriculture are hit hardest. Although energy is
substituted for land, overall energy consumption falls with the shrinking economy, hurting
energy exporters. With full coastal protection, GDP increases, particularly in regions with
substantial dike building, but utility falls, least in regions that protect their coasts and export
energy. Energy prices rise and energy consumption falls. The costs of full protection exceed the
costs of losing land. The results also show direct costs – the usual method for estimating
welfare changes due to sea level rise – are a bad approximation of the general equilibrium
welfare eﬀects; previous estimates of the economic impact of sea level rise are therefore biased.
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1. Introduction
Of the many impacts of climate change, sea level rise is often seen as one of
the more threatening. The impacts of sea level rise are straightforward – more
coastal erosion and sea ﬂoods, unless costly adaptation is undertaken – and
unambiguously negative (unless one happens to be in the dike building sec-
tor). Sea level rise could have very substantial impacts in river deltas, and
may wipe out entire islands and island nations (McLean et al. 2001).
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Therefore, sea level rise ﬁgures prominently in assessments of the impacts
of climate change, and the costs of sea level rise ﬁgures equally prominently
in estimates of the costs of climate change. The majority of estimates of the
economic damages of global warming rely on the methodology of direct
costs, that is, damage equals price times quantity. The direct cost method
ignores that the quantity change – say, the amount of land lost to sea level
rise – may well aﬀect the price – say, of coastal land. Furthermore, this
method ignores that changes in one market – say, the market of land – have
implications for all other markets. In this paper, we estimate and compare the
direct costs, the partial equilibrium eﬀects, and the general equilibrium eﬀects
of sea level rise.
The methodology can be brieﬂy described as follows. Land losses due to
sea level rise and costs of coastal protection are taken from the FUND
database and model. Combined with scenarios of sea level rise, population
growth and economic growth, this yields direct cost estimates as approximate
welfare changes. Land losses or coastal protection are fed into GTAP-EF, to
simulate general equilibrium eﬀects on the world economy.
To our knowledge, two other papers have attempted this.1 Deke et al.
(2001) use the DART model to estimate economy-wide implications of sea
level rise. Their study is restricted to the costs of coastal protection,
ignoring land losses and its wider economic consequences. Deke et al.
(2001) subtract the costs of coastal protection from total investment (equal
to savings), thereby splitting investment between unproductive coastal
protection and productive net investment. As they use a Solow-Swan
growth engine to drive their recursive-dynamic CGE model, they essentially
reduce the capital stock, and hence economic output and future con-
sumption levels. Yet, in the short run, gross investment and ﬁnal con-
sumption are unaﬀected, thereby ignoring the stimulus to the engineering
sector from extra investment in dikes and seawalls. Darwin and Tol (2001)
use the FARM model, which is a static CGE. Their study is very similar to
ours, but their CGE model is based on older data on national production
and international trade. Furthermore, investments in coastal protection are
modelled as a general loss of productive capital; Darwin and Tol (2001) do
this instantaneously, while Deke et al. (2001) reduce the capital stock with
a period’s delay. Both Deke et al. and Darwin and Tol ignore the induced
investment demand for of coastal protection, thus overstating the negative
impact of sea level rise.2 In this paper, we model coastal protection
explicitly as an additional investment, thereby considering the eﬀects
induced by a diﬀerent ﬁnal demand in the economy. In contrast to Deke
et al. and Darwin and Tol, we assume that investing in coastal protection
crowds out consumption rather than other investment.3 Like Darwin and
Tol, but unlike Deke et al., we also consider a scenario in which coasts are
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not protected but land gets lost instead. Although FARM has a much
richer representation of land and land use than does our model, this fea-
ture was not used by Darwin and Tol (2001); instead, land use was ﬁxed,
and each land type had the same proportional land loss. In our model,
there is only one type of land. Like Darwin and Tol, we assume that part
of this endowment disappears under the rising sea, and analyse the con-
sequences for the economy. Like Darwin and Tol and Deke et al., we
consider only a subset of the impacts of sea level rise, namely erosion,
inundation, and coastal protection. There are other eﬀects not considered
here, for example, salt water intrusion, changes in tourist behaviour, or
increased storm surges.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our variant of
the GTAP-E CGE model, called GTAP-EF. Section 3 discusses the impli-
cations of sea level rise. Section 4 discusses how these implications are
brought into the CGE model. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 con-
cludes.
2. Model and Simulations
In order to assess the systemic, general equilibrium eﬀects of sea-level rise, we
made an unconventional use of a multi-country world CGE model: the
GTAP model (Hertel 1996), in the GTAP-E version modiﬁed by Burniaux
and Truong (2002), and subsequently extended by ourselves (GTAP-EF).4 A
concise description of the model structure, and of its basic assumptions, can
be found in the appendix.
A CGE model provides a consistent and detailed description of an eco-
nomic system, highlighting trade linkages between industries, regions and
markets. We use a CGE model here to simulate the impact of exogenous
changes in the composition of ﬁnal demand and/or of available endowments
of land in diﬀerent countries.
The mathematical structure of a CGE model can be very complex. In
particular, the GTAP model (and its variants) consists of hundreds of
equations. See Hertel (1996) and http://www.gtap.org. A concise description
of the model is provided in Appendix 1 of this paper. Typically, parameters
in a CGE model are selected such that the model replicates the observed
structure of the economy, as described in a calibration data-set, for a recent,
reference year.
One problem of our application is given by the fact that we are interested
in simulating changes occurring at some future dates, rather than at present
time. Therefore, instead of relying on current calibration data, we base our
exercise on a benchmark scenario of the world economic structure.
To this end, we derived baselines for the world economy at some selected
future years (2010, 2030, 2050), using the methodology described in Dixon
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and Rimmer (2002). This entails inserting, in the model calibration data,
scenario values for some key economic variables, to identify a hypothetical
general equilibrium state for the future. This hypothetical equilibrium pro-
vides a benchmark, on which we build our comparative static exercise. This
benchmark is subsequently compared with a counter-factual equilibrium, in
which sea level impacts take place. Note that there is no explicit, dynamic
process of adjustment.
To get the model baseline, we focused primarily on the supply side, by
imposing estimates for future endowments of labour, capital, land, natural
resources, as well as variations in factor-speciﬁc and multi-factor produc-
tivity, for the various industries and regions of the model.
Most of these variables (e.g., labour) are ‘‘naturally exogenous’’ in CGE
models, so it is suﬃcient to change their levels from those of the initial
calibration year of the model (1997) to those estimated for the future. In
some other cases, we considered variables, which are normally endogenous in
the model, and swapped them with exogenous variables.
We obtained estimates of the regional labour and capital stocks by run-
ning the G-Cubed model (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1998). We took estimates
of land endowments and agricultural land productivity from the IMAGE
model version 2.2, scenario IPCC B1 (IMAGE 2001).
A diﬀerent methodology was used for the natural resources stock vari-
ables. Values for these variables in the original GTAP data set are not from
oﬃcial statistics, but were calibrated to industry supply elasticities, taken
from the literature (Hertel and Tsigas 2002). For this reason, we preferred to
ﬁx the price of the natural resources, and have it vary over time with GDP,
and used the model to compute the corresponding stock levels.
3. Impacts of Sea Level Rise
In order to evaluate the impacts of sea level rise in the eight regions of
GTAP-EF, we use information about potential losses of land and cost esti-
mations of coastal protection. This information is exogenous to the CGE
model, and it is used to generate the shocks in the simulation experiments. In
reality, there will be a mix of protection and land loss; we here present the
two extreme cases, avoiding the question how to trade-oﬀ land loss and
protection. This section presents the sea level rise impact estimates that were
used as inputs to the CGE model. Sea level rise would have a range of
impacts. We here only include inundation and erosion. Flooding, salt water
intrusion, and wetland loss are omitted for want of data.
For each region, Table I presents estimates of the potential dryland loss
without protection. Our main source of information is the GVA (Global
Vulnerability Assessment; Hoozemans et al. 1993), an update of work earlier
done in the context of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
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(IPCC CZMS 1990, 1992). The GVA reports impacts of a 1 m sea level rise
scenario for all countries in the world. The GVA is not perfect, and its data
are old. However, it is the only global and consistent database on sea level
rise impacts available to date.
Dryland losses (in square kilometres) are not reported in the GVA, but
they are, for selected countries, by Bijlsma et al. (1996), Nicholls and
Leatherman (1995), Nicholls et al. (1995) and Beniston et al. (1998). Note
that these are land losses due to erosion and inundation only. The GVA
reports people-at-risk (in thousands of people), which is the number of
people living in the one-in-1000-year ﬂood plain, weighted by the chance of
inundation. Combining this with the GVA’s coastal population densities (in
people per square kilometre), area-at-risk (in square kilometre) results. The
exponent of the geometric mean of the ratio between area-at-risk and land
loss for the 18 countries in Bijlsma et al. (1996), excluding wetland loss, was
used to derive land loss for all other countries from the GVA’s area-at-risk.
This procedure introduces additional uncertainty. The review of the SCOR
Table I. No protection scenario: main economic indicators
Land
(%)
Loss
(km2)
Direct
(Mln $)
Costs
(%GDP)
GDP
(%)
Utility
(%)
CO2
(%)
A: Only land losses
USA )0.055 5000 102 0.0002 )0.002 )0.005 0.010
EU )0.032 1015 187 0.0010 )0.001 )0.005 0.012
EEFSU )0.020 4257 611 0.0100 )0.002 )0.006 0.005
JPN )0.153 575 20 0.0001 )0.001 0.003 0.035
RoAx1 )0.006 1065 221 0.0030 0.000 0.008 0.015
EEx )0.184 31847 15556 0.1010 )0.021 )0.015 )0.008
CHIND )0.083 10200 324 0.0030 )0.030 )0.062 )0.024
RoW )0.151 71314 13897 0.0600 )0.017 )0.014 )0.012
Land
(%)
Capital
(%)
GDP
(%)
Utility
(%)
CO2
(%)
B: Land and capital losses
USA )0.055 )0.055 )0.019 )0.020 )0.015
EU )0.032 )0.032 )0.014 )0.015 )0.003
EEFSU )0.020 )0.020 )0.008 )0.011 )0.001
JPN )0.153 )0.153 )0.054 )0.041 )0.051
RoAx1 )0.006 )0.006 )0.002 0.000 0.017
EEx )0.184 )0.184 )0.096 )0.077 )0.110
CHIND )0.083 )0.083 )0.052 )0.046 )0.048
RoW )0.151 )0.151 )0.076 )0.062 )0.092
Acronyms: USA, United States of America; EU, European Union; EEFSU, Eastern Europe
and the Former Soviet Union; JPN, Japan; RoA1, Rest of Annex I (developed) countries;
EEx, Energy exporters; CHIND, China and India; RoW, Rest of the World.
IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 553
Working Group 89 (1991) shows that beach erosion estimates due to climate
change are not very accurate. Land losses thus estimated (Table IA, column
3) are expressed as a percentage of total land area (Table IA, column 2) using
country areas reported by WRI (2002).
The GVA reports the costs of fully protecting the coast, with protection
standards varying in an ad hoc but sensible way with population density and
per capita income; particularly, coasts with few people in 1990 are not pro-
tected. Note that these costs are for protection against sea level rise only;
changes in storminess are ignored. Protection costs are given for a 1 m sea
level rise between 2000 and 2100, which is not very likely. However, costs are
assumed to be linear in dike height (and so in sea level rise), and therefore
readily scaled. The GVA reports the average annual investment over the
century, which we annuitised.
Coastal protection may well imply a more rapid loss of coastal wetlands.
The implications of this for the economy are here ignored, as these are dif-
ﬁcult to quantify.
Direct costs are calculated as the amount of land lost times its value. This is
a crude estimate of welfare loss, but the method is standard in the literature
(Yohe 1990; Jansen et al. 1991; Nordhaus 1991, 1994; Rijsberman 1991; Cline
1992; Titus 1992; Fankhauser 1994; Nicholls and Leatherman 1995; Nicholls
et al. 1995; Tol 1995, 1996, 2002; Yohe et al. 1995, 1996, 1999; Titus et al.
1998; Yohe and Schlesinger 1998).5 The value of land is set at $250,000/km2
in the USA, and varies with income density (GDP per area) using an elasticity
of 0.53.6
The CGE has six regions, rather than all 166 coastal countries. Country-
speciﬁc estimates of land loss, land area, expenditure on coastal protection,
and GDP were aggregated to the regional level, the ﬁrst two in square
kilometres, the last two in dollars (using market exchange rates as in
GTAP).
4. Including Impacts in the CGE Model
On the basis of the information about land loss and protection cost, we ran a
set of comparative static exercises. These exercises are meant to capture the
short run adjustments induced in the economic systems by the negative
shocks, associated with climate change and sea level rise. To this end, we
consider two polar cases.
In the ‘‘no-protection’’ scenario, we assume that no defensive expenditure
takes place, so that some land is lost in terms of productive potential, because
of erosion, ﬂooding and salt water intrusion. This case can be easily
accommodated in the model by exogenously reducing the endowment of the
primary factor ‘‘land’’ in all countries, in variable proportions.7
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In the ‘‘full-protection’’ scenario, on the contrary, we assumed that no
land is lost because of sea-level rise, but this outcome requires some speciﬁc
infrastructure investment. In practice, these measures can take the form of
dike building or elevation, beach nourishment, and protection of freshwater
resources. In the model, this translates into an exogenous increase of regional
investment expenditure.
To fully assess the results of this simulation exercise, it is important to
understand how we modiﬁed the mechanism of investment allocation in the
GTAP-EF model, as well as the diﬀerence between our approach and some
alternative modelling strategies.
Regional and global investments are endogenous variables in the GTAP
framework. In the short run, the capital stock is given in each region, and
investments are simply a demand component of GDP.8
Savings and investments are not equalized domestically, but at the global
scale.9 Savings are generated endogenously, because of the presence of a
composite good ‘‘saving’’ in the utility function of each regional represen-
tative consumer. As a consequence, regional savings vary proportionally to
the national income.10
A hypothetical ‘‘world bank’’ then collects savings and allocates invest-
ments, realizing the equalization of regional expected returns (as shown in
Appendix 1).11 In practice, since expected returns are linked to existing
capital levels, investment ﬂows are primarily directed towards regions in
which capital stocks are relatively low. However, to account for imperfect
international mobility of investment funds, and for the ‘‘home bias’’ in the
portfolio selection of investors, a region-speciﬁc, calibrated elasticity
parameter accounts for the actual degree of investment sensitivity to rate of
return diﬀerentials.
For the ‘‘full protection’’ scenario, we made the regional investment
variables exogenous, and ﬁxed their level by adding the additional expendi-
ture for coastal protection, in each region, to the initial investment level. To
ensure the equalization of global savings and investment, we allowed for an
endogenous adjustment of regional savings.12
Clearly, since global investment increases, so do global and hence
domestic savings. To save more, each representative consumer has to
consume less, thereby reducing her immediate utility. However, there is no
direct link between regional consumption and investment; countries can
run a foreign debt. Vulnerable regions would require more defensive
expenditure. Part of this spending would be ﬁnanced through foreign
investment.
Our methodology signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the one adopted by Darwin
and Tol (2001) and Deke et al. (2001). Darwin and Tol model defensive
expenditure simply by assuming that some fraction of the capital, used in the
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production of goods and services, is converted to unproductive defensive
infrastructure. The hypothesis of capital conversion is clearly unrealistic in
the short run, but could be justiﬁed as an approximation of a long-run
equilibrium in which defensive investment completely oﬀsets productive
investment, although there is no speciﬁc reason to believe that this oﬀset
would be one-for-one, Deke et al. (2001) subtracts investments in coastal
protection from overall investment, without building up a ‘‘coastal protec-
tion capital’’ or even creating a demand for dike building. Our approach is
diﬀerent, and provides the advantage of accounting for the multiplicative
eﬀects of changes in the demand structure. For example, our model generates
higher growth rates for the construction industry wherever new infrastructure
is built.
5. Results
In this section, simulation results for the year 2050 are reported and com-
mented, in terms of variation from the no-climate-change baseline equilib-
rium. Results for other reference years are qualitatively similar.
5.1. NO PROTECTION SCENARIO: LAND LOSS ONLY
Table IA shows the eﬀects of sea level rise for the no-protection scenario,
based on a uniform increase of 25 cm, which is well within the IPCC range of
10–40 cm for 2050 (Houghton et al. 2001). The table reports information
about changes in the endowments of land resources, land losses in km2, direct
costs estimated as a product of physical land losses and land prices, direct
costs as a fraction of regional GDP. All these data are inputs for the simu-
lation exercise with the CGE model. The table also shows some results, in
percentage variations, produced by the model: changes in GDP, in utility of
the representative household (related to consumption levels), and in CO2
emissions.
The fraction of land lost is quite small in all regions. Energy Exporting
Countries (EEx) suﬀer the greatest loss, loosing 0.18% of their dry land,
followed by Japan (JPN) and the Rest of the World (RoW), both with a
0.15% loss. The direct value of the land lost is large in absolute terms, but
quite small if compared to GDP (EEx has the biggest value: 0.1% of GDP).
Generally, developing regions – CHIND and RoW – experience direct losses
higher than those of developed countries, because their economies are more
agricultural and their relative land values are high. The same is true for EEx,
which includes many African countries.
GDP falls in all regions, especially in CHIND ()0.030%), EEx
()0.021%) and RoW ()0.017%).13 Two aspects are worth noting: ﬁrst,
general equilibrium eﬀects inﬂuence the cost distribution. GDP losses for
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the Former Soviet Union (EEFSU), the Rest of Annex 1 (RoA1), EEx
and RoW are lower than the direct cost of the lost land, whereas the
opposite occurs to USA, EU, JPN and CHIND; in the case JPN, the
GDP losses are even 10 times as large as the direct costs. Second, there is
no direct relationship between the environmental impact and the economic
impact. For instance, JPN exhibits the second highest amount of land lost,
but the second smallest loss of GDP. CHIND, on the contrary, has the
third smallest relative amount of land lost, but the highest cost in terms of
GDP. This highlights the importance of conducting a general equilibrium
analysis in this context, as substitution eﬀects and international trade
work as impact buﬀers or multipliers.14 Recall that land is used only in
agriculture. The impact on GDP is therefore largest in those regions in
which agriculture is a large share of the economy, that is, the poorer
regions CHIND, EEx and RoW. In addition, in richer economies, relative
prices are such that is easier to substitute other inputs (particularly, fer-
tilizer) for land.
Land is an essential factor in agriculture, so agricultural industries bear
the biggest impact of the loss of land, as can be seen in terms of higher prices
and lower production levels (Table II).
The regional impacts are illustrated in Table III. In general, lower GDP
losses are associated with investment inﬂows, so it is important to clarify the
Table II. No protection scenario: price and production levels by industry
Price index for world supply
(% change w.r.t. baseline)
Quantity index for world supply
(% change w.r.t.baseline)
Rice 0.484 )0.054
Wheat 0.314 )0.040
CerCrops 0.389 )0.042
VegFruits 0.360 )0.058
Animals 0.329 )0.045
Forestry )0.102 )0.017
Fishing )0.057 )0.020
Coal )0.068 )0.012
Oil )0.081 0.004
Gas )0.066 0.001
Oil_Pcts )0.075 0.004
Electricity )0.058 )0.007
En.Int_in )0.042 )0.013
Oth_ind 0.044 )0.033
MServ )0.040 0.003
NMServ )0.040 0.007
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role played here by the investments. Land loss is a direct resource loss, a
negative economic shock, which reduces income and consumption levels. The
value of primary resources thus falls, with the exception of land, which is
getting scarcer.
The international allocation of investments is driven by the relative price
of the capital in each country. The higher the capital return, the higher the
share of international investments ﬂowing into a country. Investment is one
component of GDP.
Changes in the price of capital are determined by two opposite eﬀects. On
one hand, the negative shock lowers the value of national resources,
including capital. On the other hand, economies try to substitute land with
capital. Capital supply is ﬁxed in the short run, though, and the higher
demand for capital translates into higher capital returns.
The fall in the relative price of capital is particularly strong in
EEx, CHIND and RoW. In the model, lower returns on capital reduce
the international capital inﬂow. This explains why regional GDP decreases
Table III. No protection scenario: industrial output and price of primary factors by region
USA EU EEFSU JPN RoA1 EEx CHIND RoW
Industry output (% change w.r.t. baseline)
Rice )0.020 0.040 )0.013 )0.019 0.056 )0.086 )0.028 )0.073
Wheat )0.051 )0.022 0.008 )0.259 0.043 )0.080 )0.033 )0.076
CerCrops )0.020 0.037 0.060 )0.069 0.103 )0.116 )0.025 )0.083
VegFruits )0.029 0.031 0.036 )0.078 0.087 )0.128 )0.050 )0.078
Animals )0.026 )0.016 0.020 )0.035 0.022 )0.094 )0.077 )0.079
Forestry )0.041 )0.024 )0.026 )0.031 )0.024 )0.015 )0.001 )0.011
Fishing )0.007 )0.012 )0.017 )0.019 )0.033 )0.015 )0.036 )0.016
Coal )0.009 )0.013 )0.008 )0.091 )0.058 0.016 )0.007 )0.012
Oil )0.011 )0.024 )0.008 )0.064 )0.033 0.013 0.019 0.000
Gas 0.003 )0.036 )0.005 )0.042 )0.048 0.036 0.022 )0.014
Oil_Pcts 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.017 0.024 0.002 )0.034 )0.006
Electricity 0.001 )0.010 0.003 )0.010 )0.023 )0.007 )0.025 )0.006
En_Int_ind )0.013 )0.015 )0.007 )0.040 )0.051 0.006 )0.003 )0.005
Oth_ind )0.021 )0.017 )0.019 )0.010 )0.009 )0.083 )0.035 )0.071
Mserv 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.010 )0.036 0.011
NMServ 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.010 0.009 0.060 0.014
Investment 0.008 0.008 )0.013 0.031 0.022 )0.066 )0.172 )0.043
Price of primary factors (% change w.r.t. baseline)
Land 0.534 0.514 0.532 1.019 0.607 0.804 0.467 0.802
Labour )0.051 )0.051 )0.059 )0.002 )0.026 )0.123 )0.196 )0.108
Capital )0.051 )0.048 )0.061 )0.001 )0.025 )0.127 )0.212 )0.112
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relatively more than private consumption in these regions, as can be seen
through the changes in the households utility index.
International trade also matters, through its eﬀects on the terms of trade.
Higher world prices for agriculture beneﬁt net-exporters of agricultural
goods (USA, RoA1, EEx), while lower prices for oil, gas, coal, oil products,
electricity, and energy intensive products harm the net-exporters of energy
products (EEx, EEFSU).
Labour, capital and energy substitute for the loss of land. At the same
time, overall economic activity falls. In the OECD regions, the former eﬀect
dominates. The growth in market services raises the consumption of oil
products, mainly by the transportation industries. Consequently, CO2
emissions increase, despite the fall in GDP. In developing regions, the latter
eﬀect dominates: the decrease of GDP is associated with a decrease in CO2
emissions.
5.2. NO PROTECTION SCENARIO: LAND AND CAPITAL LOSS
Above, we assume that there will be no investments in additional coastal
protection, but that people do retreat. This assumes that sea level rise is slow
and predictable, and that people anticipate loss of their capital goods by
depreciating the last bit of capital just before inundation.
Table IB shows the results if we assume that invested capital is lost as
well. As we have no geographically explicit representation of capital in
relation to the shore, we assume that the same proportions of capital and
land are lost.15 This should change the distribution of the impacts, as
developed countries have capital-intensive economies, in which agriculture
plays a minor role.
GDP losses are obviously higher if together with land also capital is lost to
sea level rise. The more capital-intensive developed economies are relatively
harder hit by adding capital loss are than the more land-intensive developing
economies. In general, however, the developing regions are more severely
aﬀected by climate change than the developed regions. We also see that those
economies which get hit hardest, suﬀer disproportionally compared to those
economies that suﬀer little consequences of sea level rise. The reason is that
little impacted countries gain in their competitive position, as can be seen
from the terms of trade. With capital losses added, CO2 emissions fall almost
everywhere.
5.3. TOTAL PROTECTION SCENARIO
In the protection scenario, there is no negative economic shock, since – by
assumption – the stock of land resources is fully preserved.16 However, the
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structure of ﬁnal demand changes, because investment increases and house-
hold consumption decreases.
Table IV shows the additional expenditure for the various regions. See
Section 3. Figures are relatively small in terms of GDP, but substantially
higher than the value of land lost: the highest values are for RoA1 (0.80% of
GDP) and EEFSU (0.33% of GDP), the lowest for USA (0.01% of GDP).17
The high value for RoA1 results from a combination of a long coast exposed
and high protection cost, particularly in Canada, Australia and New Zea-
land. To meet this extra demand for investment, all regions increase uni-
formly (+1.9%) their savings, reducing at the same time private
consumption, especially in CHIND ()0.96%), JPN ()0.56%) and RoW
()0.35%). The impact on regional GDP is mixed: EU and JPN experience
small losses ()0.02% and )0.01%, respectively), while all other regions gain
slightly. EU and JPN attract little additional investment and are hit hard by
the price increase of fossil fuels; USA also attracts little investment, but
suﬀers less from the energy price increase.
Regional impacts are determined by the interplay of demand eﬀects and
changes in the terms of trade (see Table V). Because of the need to ﬁnance
defensive infrastructure, the most vulnerable regions (RoA1, EEFSU)
experience net investment inﬂows, stimulating a regional GDP growth. Note
that this additional GDP does not oﬀset the costs of dike building; GDP net
of coastal protection is lower for all regions compared to the case without
climate change.
Changes in the terms of trade are mainly driven by increases in the world
price of energy products (see Table VI), beneﬁting energy exporting countries
(EEx, EEFSU), and leading to a worldwide decrease of CO2 emissions.
Table IV. Total protection scenario: main economic indicators
Region Coastal
protection
expenditure
Investment
induced
by Coastal
protection
(% change
w.r.t. baseline)
GDP
(% change
w.r.t.
baseline)
Household
utility index
(% change
w.r.t. baseline)
CO2 emissions
(% change
w.r.t.
baseline)
1997
million
US$
%
of
GDP
USA 5153 0.010 0.151 0.001 )0.206 )0.069
EU 11,213 0.025 0.302 )0.022 )0.296 )0.160
EEFSU 23,076 0.332 3.179 0.049 0.033 )0.133
JPN 7595 0.032 0.242 )0.009 )0.605 )0.344
RoA1 71,496 0.799 9.422 0.103 )0.009 )0.130
EEx 363,856 0.185 2.235 0.015 )0.223 )0.069
CHIND 11,747 0.106 1.254 0.003 )0.889 )0.116
RoW 38,808 0.148 1.817 0.009 )0.310 )0.115
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Variations in regional GDP are not particularly informative for a com-
parison of the two scenarios, but changes in aggregate private consumption
(household utility index) provide a rough estimate of the welfare impact in
the two cases. From this perspective, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in both
aggregate and distributional eﬀects. See Figure 1.
At an aggregate level, eﬀects are stronger, and globally an order of
magnitude more negative, in the total protection scenario than in the no
protection case. This seems to suggest that it would be better, economically
speaking, to avoid a full protection policy (although an optimal protection
rate likely lies between the two extremes).
There are also substantial distributional diﬀerences. Asian regions – JPN
and CHIND – are especially worse oﬀ in these circumstances in the
protection scenario. EEFSU is the only region with short-term utility gains,
because it receives the second highest inﬂux of investments in coastal
protection, and because it beneﬁts from the increased value of energy exports.
The utility loss of RoA1 is relatively small, because it receives so much
investment for coastal protection.
Table V. Total protection scenario: industrial output and price of primary factors by region
USA EU EEFSU JPN RoA1 EEx CHIND RoW
Industry output (% change w.r.t. baseline)
Rice 0.061 )0.140 )0.160 0.595 )0.560 )0.073 0.165 )0.031
Wheat 0.045 0.045 )0.073 )0.378 0.161 )0.061 0.097 )0.015
CerCrops )0.007 )0.017 )0.095 )0.061 )0.021 0.025 0.164 0.030
VegFruits )0.030 )0.060 )0.082 )0.185 )0.095 )0.045 )0.037 )0.025
Animals 0.140 0.104 )0.074 0.399 )0.478 )0.029 )0.207 )0.027
Forestry 0.091 0.112 )0.287 0.209 )0.783 )0.141 )0.273 )0.160
Fishing 0.157 0.049 )0.166 0.454 )0.854 )0.099 )0.207 )0.096
Coal 0.097 0.113 )0.244 0.876 )1.236 )0.059 0.019 0.016
Oil 0.063 0.120 )0.374 0.387 )0.691 )0.102 )0.092 )0.056
Gas 0.231 0.556 )0.419 0.177 )1.234 )0.071 0.020 )0.060
Oil_Pcts )0.121 )0.114 )0.136 )0.251 0.139 )0.101 )0.413 )0.158
Electricity 0.056 0.088 )0.249 0.042 )1.204 )0.119 )0.116 )0.109
En_Int_ind 0.259 0.269 )0.823 0.573 )2.470 )0.204 0.084 )0.132
Oth_ind 0.227 0.199 )0.177 0.655 )1.364 )0.104 0.336 )0.027
MServ )0.043 )0.055 0.257 )0.177 0.725 0.132 0.019 0.078
NMserv )0.093 )0.074 )0.004 )0.117 )0.092 )0.121 )0.382 )0.116
Price of primary factors (% change w.r.t. baseline)
Land 0.499 0.356 )0.359 2.098 )1.467 )0.101 )0.713 )0.071
Labour )0.154 )0.090 0.833 )0.536 1.376 0.251 0.111 0.130
Capital )0.144 )0.103 0.806 )0.528 1.275 0.253 0.156 0.140
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Table VI. Total protection scenario: price and production levels by industry
Price index
for world supply
(% change w.r.t.
baseline)
Quantity index for world
supply (% change
w.r.t. baseline)
Rice 0.011 0.094
Wheat 0.051 0.025
CerCrops 0.085 0.022
VegFruits )0.103 )0.043
Animals 0.022 )0.011
Forestry )0.064 )0.177
Fishing 0.038 )0.052
Coal 0.122 )0.109
Oil 0.080 )0.143
Gas 0.283 )0.180
Oil_Pcts 0.056 )0.154
Electricity 0.034 )0.080
EnInt_in 0.024 )0.002
Oth_ind )0.002 0.136
MServ )0.015 0.013
NMserv )0.016 )0.102
Figure 1. The change in household utility index with respect to the baseline for the case
without protection (wide, light bars; left axis) and the case with full protection (narrow,
dark bars; right axis).
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6. Discussion and Conclusion
We estimate the economy-wide eﬀects of sea level rise using a global com-
putable general equilibrium model with eight regions. We do so for the year
2050, assuming a 25 cm sea level rise. Other sea level scenarios are of course
possible, but would not lead to a greater qualitative insight. Alternative
economic scenarios are also possible. In our set-up, the crucial variable in the
no protection scenario is the importance of agriculture in the economy. If
agriculture is more important, the economic impact of sea level rise is greater.
In the full protection scenario, the international capital market is crucial. As
this market is only rudimentary in our static CGE, further analysis is
deferred to future research.
We distinguish two scenarios for adaptation. In the ﬁrst, coasts are
unprotected and lands are lost to the sea. In the second scenario, coasts are
fully protected. Optimal adaptation will lie somewhere in between these two
extremes. Compared to earlier studies, our treatment of the impact of sea
level rise is more complete as we study both coastal protection and land
loss, and our treatment of investments in coastal protection is more real-
istic, as we also include the induced demand from investments. Secondary
but potentially important impacts related to sea level rise are not considered
here.
On balance, the general equilibrium eﬀects add to the direct costs of land
loss or investments in coastal protection. This is because the loss of land or
investment deﬂates the entire economy. The distribution of the general
equilibrium eﬀect is very diﬀerent from the distribution of land losses or
coastal protection, and the distributional eﬀects of land losses and coastal
protection also diﬀer substantially.
For the scenario without coastal protection, the general equilibrium eﬀects
are strongest in economies that rely most on agriculture. Although energy is
substituted for the loss of land, the price of energy demand falls with the
shrinking economy, hurting energy exporters.
For the other scenario with coastal protection, GDP generally expands
as we force the model to additionally invest in coastal protection. These
investments are ﬁnanced by the global capital market. As a result, utility
falls, least in those regions with most dike building, and utility falls most in
Asia.
Like Darwin and Tol (2001) and Deke et al. (2001), we ﬁnd that direct
costs underestimate the true welfare losses and get the regional distribution
wrong at that. A detailed comparison of results is unfortunately impossible.
The earlier studies report aggregate results only, in diﬀerent units at dif-
ferent times, and for one scenario only (optimal protection/land and capital
lost in the case of Darwin and Tol; full protection in the case of Deke
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et al.); Deke et al. also use diﬀerent input data, and a recursive-dynamic
rather than a static model.
This paper shows that the economy-wide, indirect eﬀects of the impacts of
climate change are, ﬁrst, substantial compared to the direct eﬀects and,
second, distributed diﬀerently. The direct cost method still dominates the
climate change impact literature (Smith et al. 2001). As such, this paper adds
to our knowledge about climate change impacts.
Nonetheless, more research needs to be done. First, sea level rise is only
one of the many impacts of climate change. In two companion papers, we
look at health (Bosello et al. 2006) and tourism (Berrittella et al. 2006).
Furthermore, we do not even include all impacts of sea level rise; partic-
ularly, ﬂooding, wetland loss and saltwater instrusion are ignored. The
analysis here should be repeated with more up-to-date and more compre-
hensive estimates of sea level rise, as soon as these become available. Sec-
ond, we use a static CGE, limiting the analysis to the short-term eﬀects.
Fankhauser and Tol (2005) study the impact of climate change in one-
sector growth models, also ﬁnding that the indirect economic eﬀects may be
just as important as the direct costs. Third, the shocks imposed are rela-
tively crude; the allocation of land is underdeveloped in GTAP, so that
adaptation is limited; investment in coastal protection does not crowd out
other investment; and the trade-oﬀ between coastal protection and land loss
is not made. Fourth, although we ﬁnd that carbon dioxide emissions
change, we do not feed this back into the climate scenario. All this is
postponed to future research.
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Notes
1. A third paper, Kemfert (2002), includes sea level rise in a wider range of impacts, but does
not separate out the eﬀects of sea level rise. See Roson and Tol (2006).
2. This is most easily seen in terms of changes in GDP. One way of computing GDP is
through the sum of service values of primary resources. If capital stock is cut, this
translates into a direct GDP loss. On the other hand, GDP can also be expressed as the
sum of ﬁnal demand components. If additional investment is required, and ﬁnanced
through compensating reductions in consumption or other investment, GDP can only
vary as a consequence of second order (systemic) eﬀects.
3. Dike building crowding out consumption and dike building crowding out investment are
the two extreme assumptions. It would be interesting to contrast the two assumptions with
the same model and assumptions. Unfortunately, our static CGE model does not allow
for the analysis of shocks to investment. In the short run, if one type of investment
replaces other investments, while keeping total investment unchanged, macroeconomic
eﬀects are likely to be negligible, and only related to possible changes in the cost structure
of investment demand (for which macro data is not usually available).
4. A more complete description of the modelling approach can be found in Roson (2003).
5. Turner et al. (1995) use the discounted ﬂow of GDP per square kilometre as an indicator
for land value. Broadus (1996) also uses this approach.
6. This elasticity is estimated using data for the states of the USA; data are taken from US
DoC (1992, 1993).
7. In the GTAP model, land is used as a production factor only in agricultural industries. Of
course, land is necessary for other productive activities but, normally, the service cost of
land is negligible in total production costs.
8. In most dynamic CGE formulations, capital stock is updated in each period, on the basis
of depreciation and investment realized one period in advance.
9. The condition equalizing global saving and investment is the redundant equation in the
Walras general equilibrium system.
10. Regional saving shares are calibrated model parameters, diﬀerent for each region.
11. The interested reader will ﬁnd a complete description of the investments allocation
mechanism in Hertel (1996). Here, it is suﬃcient to say that this mechanism attains a
compromise between a neo-classical arbitrage and a home-biased asset allocation.
12. Assuming that all regional investments increase by the same percentage, the model
calculates the implied changes in the shares of national income devoted to savings.
13. Note that the change in the net domestic product is the sum of the change the gross
domestic product (Table IA, column 6) and the direct costs of land loss (Table IA, column
5). This implies that, overall, the direct cost method underestimates the true costs of land
loss, a point also noted by Darwin and Tol (2001).
14. Substitution reduces the economic impact of land scarcity by partly replacing the land
factor with other inputs. International trade works to the opposite direction: land scarcity
deteriorates the relative competitiveness of land-intensive industries and regions.
15. This is, by no mean, a realistic assumption. This simulation run should therefore be
interpreted as a sensitivity analysis.
16. Recall that this does not hold for wetlands.
17. Indeed, using cost-beneﬁt analysis, Fankhauser (1994) and Yohe et al. (1996) ﬁnd that it is
optimal to protect most but not all populated coasts. Note that our Table IV cannot be
readily compared to Table V in Darwin and Tol (2001) as we show results for total
protection, whereas Darwin and Tol (2001) show results for partial (optimal) protection.
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Appendix 1
A CONCISE DESCRIPTION OF GTAP-EF MODEL STRUCTURE
The GTAP model is a standard CGE static model, distributed with the
GTAP database of the world economy (http://www.gtap.org).
The model structure is fully described in Hertel (1996), where the interested
reader can also ﬁnd various simulation examples. Over the years, the model
structure has slightly changed, often because of ﬁner industrial disaggrega-
tion levels achieved in subsequent versions of the database.
Burniaux and Truong (2002) developed a special variant of the model,
called GTAP-E, best suited for the analysis of energy markets and envi-
ronmental policies. Basically, the main changes in the basic structure are:
– energy factors are taken out from the set of intermediate inputs, allowing
for more substitution possibilities, and are inserted in a nested level of sub-
stitution with capital;
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– database and model are extended to account for CO2 emissions, related to
energy consumption.
The model described in this paper (GTAP-EF) is a further reﬁnement of
GTAP-E, in which more industries are considered. In addition, some model
equations have been changed in speciﬁc simulation experiments. This
appendix provides a concise description of the model structure.
As in all CGE models, GTAP-EF makes use of the Walrasian perfect
competition paradigm to simulate adjustment processes, although the
inclusion of some elements of imperfect competition is also possible.
Industries are modelled through a representative ﬁrm, minimizing costs
while taking prices are given. In turn, output prices are given by average
production costs. The production functions are speciﬁed via a series of nested
CES functions, with nesting as displayed in the tree diagram of Figure A1.
Notice that domestic and foreign inputs are not perfect substitutes,
according to the so-called ‘‘Armington assumption’’, which accounts for –
amongst others – product heterogeneity.
In general, inputs grouped together are more easily substitutable among
themselves than with other elements outside the nest. For example, imports
can more easily be substituted in terms of foreign production source, rather
than between domestic production and one speciﬁc foreign country of origin.
Analogously, composite energy inputs are more substitutable with capital
than with other factors.
A representative consumer in each region receives income, deﬁned as the
service value of national primary factors (natural resources, land, labour,
capital). Capital and labour are perfectly mobile domestically but immobile
internationally. Land and natural resources, on the other hand, are industry-
speciﬁc.
This income is used to ﬁnance the expenditure of three classes of expen-
diture: aggregate household consumption, public consumption and savings
(Figure A2). The expenditure shares are generally ﬁxed, which amounts to
saying that the top-level utility function has a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation.
Also notice that savings generate utility, and this can be interpreted as a
reduced form of intertemporal utility.
Public consumption is split in a series of alternative consumption items,
again according to a Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation. However, almost all
expenditure is actually concentrated in one speciﬁc industry: Non-market
Services.
Private consumption is analogously split in a series of alternative com-
posite Armington aggregates. However, the functional speciﬁcation used at
this level is the Constant Diﬀerence in Elasticities form: a non-homothetic
function, which is used to account for possible diﬀerences in income elas-
ticities for the various consumption goods.
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In the GTAP model and its variants, two industries are treated in a special
way and are not related to any country, viz. international transport and
international investment production.
International transport is a world industry, which produces the transpor-
tation services associated with the movement of goods between origin and
destination regions, thereby determining the cost margin between f.o.b. and
c.i.f. prices. Transport services are produced by means of factors submitted
by all countries, in variable proportions.
In a similar way, a hypothetical world bank collects savings from all
regions and allocates investments so as to achieve equality of expected future
Figure A1. Nested tree structure for industrial production processes.
Figure A2. Nested tree structure for ﬁnal demand.
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rates of return. Expected returns are linked to current returns and are deﬁned
through the following equation:
res ¼ rcs
kes
kbs
 q
where: r is the rate of return in region s (superscript e stands for expected, c
for current), kb is the capital stock level at the beginning of the year, ke is the
capital stock at the end of the year, after depreciation and new investment
have taken place. q is an elasticity parameter, possibly varying by region,
determining the sensitivity of regional investments to rate of returns diﬀer-
entials. When the model is calibrated, all variables on the right-hand side are
known. Therefore, to be consistent with the assumption of equalization of
expected returns, this elasticity parameter q is estimated accordingly. In this
way, investment funds are modelled as imperfectly mobile in international
markets.
Future returns are determined, through a kind of adaptive expectations, from
current returns, where it is also recognized that higher future stocks will
lower future returns. Regional investments determine the stocks of capital at
the end of each period, so that the arbitrage condition on expected returns is
satisﬁed.
In this way, savings and investments are equalized at the international but
not at the regional level. Because of accounting identities, any ﬁnancial
imbalance mirrors a trade deﬁcit or surplus in each region.
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